Achievable secrecy rate regions for the general
3-receiver broadcast channel with one common and one confidential message sets are established. We consider two setups: (i) when the confidential message is to be sent to two of the receivers and the third receiver is an eavesdropper; and (ii) when the confidential message is to be sent to one of the receivers and the other two receivers are eavesdroppers. We show that our secrecy rate regions are optim urn for some special cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a seminal paper, Wyner [1] introduced the wiretap channel, where a sender wishes to communicate a message to a receiver, while keeping the message secret from an eavesdropper. He established the secrecy capacity of the channel, which is the optimal trade-off between the rate for reliable communication to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper's message equivocation rate. This result was later extended by Csiszar and Komer [2] to establish the secrecy capacity of the 2-receiver broadcast channel with one confidential message and one common message. In their setup, a common message is to be sent to both receivers and a confidential message is to be sent only to the first receiver under a constraint on the second receiver's (eavesdropper) equivocation rate. More recent work following this direction includes the paper by Ruoheng et al. [3] in which inner and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity regions of both the broadcast and interference channels with independent confidential messages are established.
Extending the result of Csiszar and Komer to more than 2 receivers has remained open, since the capacity region (without secrecy constraints) of the 3-receiver broadcast channel with degraded message sets is not known in general. Recently, Nair and EI Gamal [4] showed that the straightforward extension of the Komer and Marton capacity region for the 2-receiver broadcast channel with degraded message sets [5] to more than 3 receivers is not optimal. They established an achievable 978-1-4244-4313-0/09/$25.00 ©2009 IEEE
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In this paper, we consider the 3-receivers broadcast channel with one common and one confidential message sets. This setup leads to two natural variations; a 2receiver, l-eavesdropper scenario where the confidential message is to be reliably communicated to two receivers and kept secret from the third receiver, and a I-receiver; 2-eavesdropper scenario where the confidential message is to be communicated to only one receiver and kept secret from the other two receivers. We establish inner bounds on the secrecy capacity regions for both scenarios using the techniques of rate splitting, superposition coding, random binning, Marton binning, and indirect decoding [4] . We specialize the inner bound for the 2receiver, I-eavesdropper setup to obtain a lower bound on the secrecy capacity for the case where a message is to be sent to the two receivers but kept secret from the eavesdropper. We show that this lower bound is tight for the reversely degraded product broadcast channel. For the I-receiver, 2-eavesdropper scenario, we establish inner and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region for the class of 3-receiver multi-level broadcast channel [6] . We show that the bounds coincide when the receiver is more capable than the non-degraded eavesdropper.
II. DEFINITIONS AND PROBLEM SETUP
We consider the 3-receiver discrete memoryless broadcast channel with input alphabet X, output alphabets Yl,Y2, Y3 and conditional probability mass functions p(Yl' Y2, Y31 x) and investigate the following two scenarios.
A. 2-Receivers, l-Eavesdropper
Here the confidential message is to be sent to receivers Y 1 and Y 2 and is to be kept secret from the eavesdropper 
The equivocation rate at receiver Y 3 , which measures the amount of uncertainty receiver Y 3 has about message M l , is given by H(M l ly 3 n )/ n. 
B. I-Receiver; 2-Eavesdroppers
In this scenario, the confidential message is to be sent only to receiver Y l and kept secret from the eavesdroppers Y 2 and Y 3 . A (2nRo,2nRl,n) message set code for this scenario consists of the same message sets and encoding function as in the 2-receiver, l-eavesdropper case. The first decoder assigns to each received sequence 
The equivocation rates at the two eavesdroppers are H(M l ly 2 n )/ n and H(M l ly 3 n )/ n.
n----+oo n The secrecy capacity region is the closure of the set of achievable rate tuples (R o , R 1, R e 2 , R e 3 ) .
In the following sections, we establish inner bounds on the secrecy capacity regions for the above two scenarios.
III. 2-RECEIVERS, I-EAVESDROPPER
We establish an inner bound on the secrecy capacity for the 3-receiver broadcast channel with one common and one confidential message when the confidential message is to be sent to receivers Y l and Y 2 and kept secret from receiver Y 3 . As motivation, first consider the case when M o == 0 and M', == M E [1 :
2 nR ] is to be kept asymptotically secret from Y 3 , i.e., lim n ----+ oo I(M; y 3 n )/ n == O. For this case, a straightforward extension of the Csiszar and Komer [2] scheme to 3-receivers yields the achievable secrecy rate
Now, suppose Y 3 is a degraded version of Y l , then from the Wyner wiretap result, we know that Using Fourier-Motzkin shows the achievability of the rate
The above argument can be generalized to obtain the following inner bound.
Theorem l : An inner bound to the secrecy capacity region of the 2-receiver, l-eavesdropper broadcast channel with one common and one confidential messages is given by the set of non-negative rate tuples (R a, R 1, R e ) such that
Note that if we discard the equivocation constraints and set Va == VI == V 2 == X, the inner bound reduces to the straightforward extension of the Komer-Marton degraded message set region to the 3-receiver case [4, Corollary 1]. We provide a proof outline.
Codebook generation: Randomly and independently generate 2 nRo sequences un (nu,) each according to rr~=l P(Ui). For each un(ma), independently generate 2 nR1 sequences v[)(ml' ma) each according to rr~=l p(vailui). For each v[)(ml' ma), generate 2 nT1 sequences vr(tl, ml, ma) each according to rr~=l p(VIi IVai), and partition them into 2 nS1 equal size bins. Similarly, for each v[)(ml' ma), randomly generate 2 nT2 sequences v'2 (t2, ml, ma) each according to rr~=l p(V2i IVai), and partition them into 2 nS2 bins. Finally, for each product bin (ll' l2) E [1 : 2 nS1] x [1 : 2 nS2], find a jointly typical sequence pair (vr(tl(ll), ml, ma), v'2(t2(l2), ml, ma)). This succeeds with high probability provided
Encoding: To send a message pair (ma, ml), the encoder first chooses the sequence pair (un (ma), v[) (ml' ma)).
It then randomly chooses a product bin (L 1 , L 2 ) and finds the jointly typical sequence pair (vr(tl(L 1), ml, ma), v'2(t2(L 2), ml, ma)) in it. Finally, 3 ISIT 2009, Seoul, Koea, June 28 -July 3, 2009 it generates a codeword X" at random according to rr~=l P(XilVIi, V2i). Decoding 
Equivocation analysis: We consider two cases. If 
where (b) follows by the data processing inequality, (c) follows by the concavity of mutual information (averaged over codewords), (d) holds from the rate definitions, (e) follows because conditioning reduces entropy, (g) follows from the constraint I (VI, V 2;
Using Fourier-Motzkin gives the achievable region stated in Theorem 1.
As a special case of Theorem 1, consider the asymptotically perfect secrecy setting. In the proof of Theorem 1, we showed that a sub-message M lp with rate RIp == R l -1(V a; Y 3 1 U) -48(E) can be hidden from the eavesdropper with asymptotically perfect secrecy. Using this observation and the fact that the region in Theorem 1 is convex, we set R a == 0 and R == R l -1(V a; Y 3 IQ) in the characterization of Theorem 1 to obtain the following. 
for some p(q,va,vl,V2,X) == p(q)p(valq)P(Vllva) . p(x, v2lva, VI) p(q)p(valq)P(V2I va)P(x, vllva, V2) such that 1(Vl, V 2; Y 3IVa)
As an example of Corollary 1, consider the reversely degraded product broadcast channel with sender X == (Xl, X 2 ... ,Xk), receivers }j == (}jl' }j2 ... , }jk) for j == 1, 2, 3, and conditional probability mass functions p(Yl' Y2, Y31x) == IT7=1 p (YlZ, Y2Z, Y3zlxz) . In [7] , it is shown that the secrecy rate R is achievable if k R < min L[1(Uz; }jz) -1(Uz; Y 3Z)]+ (1) jE{1,2} Z=l for some p(Ul, . . . ,Uk, x) == IT7=1 p(uz)p(xzluz). Further, this rate is shown to be optimal when the channel is reversely degraded (with Ui == Xz), i.e., each subchannel is degraded but not necessarily in the same order. We can show that this result is a special case of Corollary 1. Define the sets of l indexes: C :== {l : 
Ifwe set V == X and discard the terms involving R e , we obtain the capacity region for the degraded message sets in [4] . Setting U == U 3 == Y 3 == 0, V == X, R a == 0, and R e2 == R l , we obtain the secrecy capacity of the Wyner wiretap channel. Further, setting Y 2 == 0, U1 == U2 == U, we obtain the Csiszar-Korner secrecy region.
The proof of achievability follows that of [4, Section III], with V playing the role of X. 
The equivocations can be calculated in the same way as in the previous section, and we obtain the constraints
Finally, we show that we can choose 8 1 and 8 2 to achieve any point in the region given by Theorem 2.
We now establish an outer bound and use it to show that the inner bound in Proposition 1 is tight for several special cases.
Proposition 2: An outer bound on the secrecy capacity of the multi-level 3-receiver broadcast channel with one common and one confidential messages is given by the set of rate tuples (R a, The proof of this proposition uses a combination of standard converse techniques from [8] , [9] and [2] .
Using Propositions 1 and 2, we can establish the secrecy capacity region for the following special cases.
1) Y 1 more capable than Y 3 : If Y 1 is more capable than Y 3 , the capacity region is given by: for some p(u, U3, x) == p(u)p(u3Iu)p(xlu3).
2) One eavesdropper: Here, we consider the two scenarios where either Y 2 or Y 3 is an eavesdropper and the other receiver is neutral, i.e., there is no constraint on its equivocation. The secrecy capacity regions for these two scenarios are as follows.
Y 3 is neutral: The secrecy capacity region is the set of rate tuples (R a, R 1, R e2) such that 
